University of Pennsylvania

Law Review
And American Law Register
FOUNDED 1852
Published Monthly, Except July, August and September, by the University of Pennsylvania Law School, at 236 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, Pa., and
34th and Chestnut Streets, Philadelphia, Pa.
VOLUME 62

FEBRUARY, 1914.

NUMBER 4

THE FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST ACT OF 1890.*
COMMON CARRIERS.

Public service corporations, of which railroads will be the
only topic of our discussion, are, so far as the law of restraints
on trade is concerned, subject to different principles from those
which obtain in the case of an ordinary merchant. Railroads
are compelled by law to carry, that is, to sell their transportation for a certain price, whereas a merchant may never be compelled to sell at any given price. 113

The purchaser must pay the

price exacted, or go without the article, and the law only indirectly affects the price by endeavoring to promote that freedom
of trade which will furnish an opportunity for the operation of
the forces of competition. It is perfectly clear, therefore, that
the two cases are so entirely different as to utterly exclude any
common treatment by the law of restraints on trade. The AntiTrust Act, however, unfortunately takes no account of this obvious distinction, and contains no exemption of or particular provisions as to carriers. A railroad company may be considered
as a monopoly or as a member of a combination. Every railroad is a monopoly as to all transportation between non-coin* This is the third and last of a series of articles commenced in the December (1913) issue, 62 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REv EW, 73.
' This distinction was pointed out by Shiras, J., in U. S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn. (1893) 58 Fed. 58 at 88, 89, I Fed. A. T. Dec. i86 at 226,
227. Peckham, J., in U. S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn. (1897) 166
U. S. 29o at 321, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 540, 41 L. Ed. IOO7, x Fed. A. T. Dec. 648

at 676.
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petitive points on its line,' 14 and is a monopoly by grant from
the state. Where the non-competitive points are situate in different states, the railroad is on a strict construction subject to the
provisions of the act, and may be dissolved in proceedings by
the United States under Section 4, a result which was probably
never intended. No proceedings of this kind appear to have
been taken against a single railroad, but in such a case the court
could only save the railroad by adopting a liberal construction
and practically flying in the teeth of the statute.
A railroad company is a seller of transportation, and when
two or more competing railroads combine to fix the rates of
transportation, they deprive shippers of their freedom in making
purchases of transportation. Such a combination, therefore, so
far as it relates to interstate transportation, is clearly within the
act, whether the combination takes the form of an agreement
under which the companies do business, or whether they combine
under a corporate charter.
The question as to the validity of such a combination may
arise in (i) proceedings by the United States under Section 4
for its dissolution; (2) proceedings under Section 7 for treble
damages; (3) proceedings independently of the act. We shall
take these up in the order named.
The general question as to the application of the act to
carriers was raised and settled in the Joint Traffic Cases. 15
In these cases it appeared that certain railroads formed an association, with a committee which was charged with the duty
of fixing rates, and provision was made for imposing a penalty
on such members of the association as refused to observe the rate
thus prescribed. The association was formed with the object
."This aspect of a railroad company as a monopoly has been pointed out
in the cases: Holmes, J., in Northern Securities Co. v. U. S.(i9o4) 193 U. S.
197 at 4o6, 24 Sup. Ct Rep. 436, 48 L. Ed. 679, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 338 at 528.
Shiras, J., in U. S.v. Trans-Mo. Frt. Assn. (0893) 58 Fed. 58 at 87, I Fed.
A. T. Dec. i86 at 225.
'U. S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn. (I897) i66 U. S.29o, 17 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 540, 41 L. Ed. ioo7, i Fed. A. T. Dec. 648, reversing 58 Fed. 58, i Fed.
A. T. Dec. i86, which affirmed 53 Fed. 44o, i Fed. A. T. Dec. 8o, where the
bill was dismissed. U. S. v. Joint Traffic Assn. (I898) 171 U. S. 505, 19
Sup. Ct. Rep. 25, 43 L. Ed. 259, 1 Fed. A. T. Dec. 869, reversing 89 Fed. 1020,
I Fed. A. T. Dec. 869, which affirmed 76 Fed. 895, 1 Fed. A. T. Dec. 615,
where the bill was dismissed.
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of preventing rates being lowered by unrestricted competition
below a reasonable rate. It appeared further that the agreement, while eliminating competition between the members of the
association, did not eliminate competition between them and
other railroads. There were other railroads operating in the
same territory, and it did not clearly appear that the association
obtained control of the market in selling transportation in the
territory affected. It was held that the association violated the
provisions of the Act of 189o and an injunction was issued
accordingly.
Every railroad company was, before the passage of the AntiTrust Act, subject to a duty to carry for a reasonable rate, whatever a reasonable rate may be, and it seems clear that no railroad
can escape that liability by any combination with another railroad. It seems, therefore, as if railroad companies, whether acting
separately or in combination, are or may be adequately governed
by the law relating to carriers. Although this position was
strongly urged upon the court, it seems clear that the decision
°
was correct because there is nothing in the Act of 189 excluding
16
combinations of carriers from the operation of its provisions."
It would no doubt be a great advantage if carriers were excluded
from the Anti-Trust Act and separately provided for.
7
In Northern Securities Co. v. United States," the controlling interests of two railroad companies were transferred to a
holding company, the stockholders of the railroad company
receiving the stock of the holding company in exchange. The
two railroad companies were parallel, but the amount
of traffic as to which there was competition between them
amounted to only 3 per cent. of the whole business. On bill filed
by the United States, a decree was entered forbidding the hold"' The court, however, in these cases unfortunately showed a tendency to
confuse the question of a reasonable rate with a reasonable restraint on trade.
One thing seems clear, however, and that is that the reasonableness of a rate
is not determined solely by the forces of competition. The remarks of Shiras,
J., in U. S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn. (1893) 58 Fed. 58 at go, I Fed.
A. T. Dec. x86 at 229, that the reasonable rate the community is entitled to is
a rate as the result of a free and unrestrained competition, may be disregarded
as unsound.

) (1904) 193 U. S. 197, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 436, 48 L. Ed. 679, 2 Fed. A. T.

Dec. 338, affirming 12o Fed. 72I, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec.

215.
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ing company from exercising any rights of ownership as to the
stock of the railroad companies which it held, thus indirectly
compelling the re-exchange of the stock of the holding company
for the stock of the railroad company. In the Supreme Court,
Harlan, J., delivered the opinion, proceeding on the ground that
the combination was within the Anti-Trust Law, because it was
formed for the purpose of suppressing competition between the
railroads, and it was not necessary to show that competition was
actually suppressed, and that the device of creating the holding
corporation would not suffice to prevent the application of the act.
In United States v. Hamburg-American Line, et al.,"18 the
complaint set out that the defendant steamship lines had entered
into an agreement dividing certain traffic according to stated percentages, pooled receipts, used unfair methods and oppression in
dealing with competitors, and charged excessive rates to the public and thereby acquired a virtual monopoly of the transportation
business embraced in the agreement. Demurrer overruled. The
court dwelt upon accompanying acts of oppression and upon
effect of the combination on the market.
In United States v. Terminal R. R. Assn.,"19 a bill was filed
by the United States to enforce the provisions of the act against
a number of defendants who had brought about a union terminal
company in St. Louis. The result of the association was that
no railroad company could pass through or enter St. Louis without using the facilities entirely controlled by the Terminal Company. Previous to this combination, there were three competing
terminal companies. The court held, however, that a unification of terminals was frequently in the interest of good business
management and was valid if fairly managed, and all railroads
were given equal facilities without discrimination; but where, as
in the case at bar, the management was unfair, a decree was to be
entered directing a fair management upon equal terms to all and
not a decree dissolving the combination. This is an entirely new
application of the law and is a striking illustration of the flexi(1911)

4 Fed. A. T. Dec. 440, 2oo Fed. Rep. 8o6.

...
(191) 224 U. S. 383, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 507, 56 L. Ed. Sio. See 154 Fed.
268, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 2-65, 145 Fed. 486, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 34.
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bility of the remedy of a court of equity, and is very much the
decree that many persons contend should have been entered in
the Northern Securities case, that is, a decree directing the combination to be managed properly.
In United States v. Reading Coal Co., et al.,120 it appeared
that several competing railroads running to the anthracite coal
regions in Pennsylvania, in order to prevent the construction of
a competitive line, together formed a corporation (the Temple
Iron Company) through which they purchased the coal mines
owned by the chief promoters of the proposed railroad, and the
coal from which was to furnish the principal tonnage therefor,
thereby preventing the construction of the road. Held in the
court below, and affirmed on appeal, that the transaction was
clearly in violation of the Act of 189O.121
In United States v. Union Pacific R. R. Co.,'1 22 it appeared

that the Union Pacific Railroad had acquired by purchase 46
per cent. of the stock of the Southern Pacific Railroad, giving
it control of that corporation. A bill was filed by the United States
to enforce the provisions of the act against this control by the
Union Pacific Railroad of the other corporation. The court
below held that the companies were not in active competition
except as to an infinitely small amount of business but were
really partners, particularly as the Union Pacific Railroad by the
stock purchase acquired the use of a line belonging to the Southern
Pacific Railroad, running from Ogden to the Pacific coast,
giving it a shorter outline to that region. On appeal, the"
Supreme Court held that there was no such partnership as found
by the court below, and that the Union Pacific Railroad was
acting in violation of the Act of I89O, and it was directed to
divest itself of the stock control. This is the last case arising on
(1912) 226 U. S. 324, 33 Sup. Ct. 9o, 59 L. Ed. go (igio) reversing in
part 183 Fed. 427, 4 Fed. A. T. Dec. 3o3; see U. S. v. Lake Shore & Michigan
So. Ry. Co. (1912) 203 Fed. 295.
' A number of other combinations appeared by the evidence, but their
legality was not passed on by the court as the consideration of them was not
admissible under the frame of the bill.
(1912) 226 U. S. 6i, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 53, 57 L. Ed. 53, reversing in
part 188 Fed. 102, 4 Fed. A. T. Dec. 303.
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proceedings by the United States against common carriers, and it
will appear that in almost every, case which has reached the
Supreme Court, the combination between carriers has been enjoined no matter in what form it appeared, whether a corporate
control merger or agreement between the companies.
It is apprehended that in this particular the law will take a
path somewhat separate from the law relating to ordinary business.
This is so because the common carrier occupies such a peculiar position in the law and is under such important duties, and at the same
time possesses such tremendous powers. The court has evidently
felt that every combination between carriers is to be viewed with
the gravest concern, and it might almost be said that there is apresumption against the legality of any such arrangement. This only
leads us more strongly to the conclusion that the case of common
carriers should be entirely separately provided for and not included in the same law as that relating to ordinary combinations.
Where, however, the suit is brought (i) under Section 7
against a combination of carriers or (2) between the carriers
themselves endeavoring to enforce the terms of the agreement
as against each other, the difficulty is that the court must determine whether the rate charged is reasonable or unreasonable and
what is a reasonable rate; the Anti-Trust Act contains no provision on this subject; another reason why carriers should not
have been included in the act and should be separately provided
for. 123 It seems, therefore, that in a proceeding by a shipper to

enjoin a combination of railroads from charging unreasonable
rates, a prayer for an injunction against the combination as in
illegal restraint of trade, will be improper. 124 The question of
whether a rate is reasonable or not is therefore not properly to be
determined under the provisions of the Act of 189o. No case has
arisen of a suit between carriers, members of a combination, to
enforce the terms of the combination against each other.
However, an action may be brought under Section 7 against
'United
States cannot maintain a bill in equity under Act of "18go to
prevent granting of rebates. U. S. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1905) 142
Fed. 176, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 831.
Tift v. Southern Ry. Co. (195o) 138 Fed. 753 at 76o, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec.
733 at 744.
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a combination of carriers. In such a case, where the unjust or
unreasonable rate has been fixed as one of the constituent acts
in carrying out a combination unlawful under the act, the party
who has been prevented by the unreasonable rate from shipping
at all may sue the railroad company as one of the members of
the combination, notwithstanding the unreasonableness of the
rate has not been passed on by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The fact that the question as to the unreasonableness of
25
the rate may be determined in two ways is immaterial .
Several cases have arisen of suits between parties and carriers
independently of the act. They are as follows:
In Steele v. United Fruit Co.,1 26 a bill by a stockholder of a
steamship company against a corporation and officers of the
steamship company, which corporation had acquired a controlling
interest in the steamship line and used it (i) to suppress competition between itself and the steamship line, (2) violating neutrality laws, (3) fraudulent mismanagement for the benefit of
the United Fruit Company. Bill was sustained, it being held that
the acquisition was for the purpose of eliminating competition.
No discussion of injury to stockholder. This case decides that
mere purchase of a controlling stock interest in a corporation
by a competitor is a violation of the act.
In Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. Co. v. Kutter,1'2 7 it was held that a contract whereby a railroad company
made an individual an exclusive agent for a term of years to
build up a milk business, was valid and enforceable between the
parties, notwithstanding the Act of 189o.
In Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. Co. v.
Franks,128 the plaintiff railroad company was denied equitable
relief because it was a member of an illegal combination.
1 29
In Prescott & A. C. R. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co.,
I Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. (i9io) 183 Fed. 548, 3 Fed. A. T.
Dec. 969, reversing 162 Fed. 354, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 38o; see also 175 Fed. 320.
Plaintiff's damages were loss of business and loss Qf profits on business
transacted.
'
(19I1) i9o Fed. 631, 4 Fed. A. T. Dec. 386.
1 (19o6) 147 Fed. 51, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. lo21.
(igol) Iio Fed. 689, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 81.
(1896) 73 Fed. 438, i Fed. A. T. Dec. 604.
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an action was brought by a railroad against another railroad
company and others for damages caused by refusing to accept
freight from the plaintiff company on through bills when such
freight was accepted and carried on through bills on contract
with other railroad companies, which other contracts were exclusive of the plaintiff. It was held there could be no recovery, that
the contract between the railroad companies as to exchange of
passengers and freight was valid at common law, and not void
under either the Act of 189o or the Interstate Commerce Act. 130
The case of discrimination by a carrier stands on a somewhat different footing. Trade may be restrained in so far as
the discrimination operates to the disadvantage of any shipper
or particular number of shippers and the total volume of trade
may be increased by the discrimination in question. The com-petitor is generally the one who is benefited to the disadvantage
of the party he competes against. From the shipper's point of
view, the discrimination, in so far as it can be ascribed to the
act of the competitor, is very close to the line of unfair competition, and, if it could be considered as such, is subject to the
provisions of the act. So far as the carrier is concerned, it is
an evasion of its common law liability to carry for all equally,
and the injury to the shipper does not seem in any sense to dome
within the provisions of the act, and it has accordingly been so
decided. 3 1
Railroads may also restrain trade in another way. An
extortionate rate charged by a carrier is a restraint operating on
both parties to a shipment, and is analogous to the restraint
caused by bad roads or lack of transportation altogether. The
difference is only in degree. It is doubtful whether this kind of
'0 Confer, Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co., et al., v. Miami S. S. Co. (i898)
86
Fed.1407, i Fed. A. T. Dec. 823.
See American Union Coal Co. v. Penna. R. R. Co. (i9o8) 159 Fed. 278,
3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 312, where the plaintiff in one count stated a cause of action
under the interstate commerce act for discrimination, and also alleged a combination on the part of the defendant with certain other railroad companies
to restrain trade, and claiming as damages the difference in charge per ton
as paid by the plaintiff and as paid by its competitors, and claiming treble
damages under §7. The court held that the claim for treble damages must
be thrown out, that is to say, a suit for damages for acts- condemned by the

commerce act cannot be brought within the provisions of the Anti-Trust Act.
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restraint was within the cognizance of the common law, and the
attention of the community has only been directed to it in recent
years when transportation has been highly developed and become
1 32
more necessary to the business life of the community.
A strike of the employees of a railroad company is a restraint
of trade in so far as it prevents the operation of the railroad and
thereby restrains the trade of all persons shipping over the line.
This restraint, however, is directly brought about by the action
of the employees, and has already been noticed under the discus3
sion of labor unions.'

3

ATTEMPT.

No case has arisen involving any decision as to the application of the provisions of the act to an attempt. An attempt is
condemned only in the second section, and the only attempt mentibned is an attempt to monopolize. It seems clear, therefore,
that under the wording of the act, an attempt to monopolize falls
within the prohibition of its terms. Every attempt to monopolize must involve (i) a contract, (2) a combination, (3) a conspiracy in restraint of trade, (4) an individual effort. If a liberal
'This aspect of a restraint by a combination very frequently appears in
the reasoning of the judges. Shiras, J., dissenting in U. S. v. Trans-Mo. Frg.
Assn. (893) 58 Fed. 58 at 87, 88, i Fed. A. T. Dec. 186 at 225. It is, however,
a very different restraint from that produced by a combination of carriers
and the two should not be confused. Hough, J., in Thomson v. Union Castle
Mail S. S. Co. 149 Fed. 933 at 935, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. io8 at iii, referred to
another aspect of a restraint on trade produced by a carrier. He said that if
a new line of foreign transportation should be organized in London to connect a United States port with a foreign port, and that line charged unreasonable rates, it could not be said to be restraining trade or commerce which
it creates and which before did not exist. It, however, does not create the
commerce; the commerce consists of the buying and selling, and the line of
ships furnishes transportation through which the commerce may flow. The
buyers and sellers were there before, but were either not buying and selling
with each other or through another avenue of transportation. The extortionate rate, therefore, does restrain commerce and the fact that the line
of transportation is a pioneer in that territory does not permit it to charge
an undue rate any more than if there were competitors or if it had been
operating some time.
'The
distinction between the carrier as a transporter of the goods sold
and the sale itself between the parties in different states was overlooked by
Platt, J., in Loewe v. Lawler (iqo6), 148 Fed. 924 at 925, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec.
41 at 43, where he said: "The real question is whether a combination which
undertakes to interfere simultaneously with both actions (the manufacture
and sale) is one which directly affects the transportation of the hats from
the place of manufacture to the place of sale." This misconception was the
chief cause of the error in the decision of the court below in this case.
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construction of the act be adopted, an attempt will never become
the subject of proceedings by the United States under Section 4
because under such cbnstruction the act only applies to restraints
actually affecting the market to an undue extent, and these can
only occur, as we have seen, from the operation of a contract,
combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade, individual effort
being valid. Therefore, no attempt to achieve a monopoly is
cognizable in civil proceedings unless it amounts to the completed
act described and condemned in Section I. Its character as an
attempt will be merged in the completed act. How far an
attempt is the subject of criminal proceedings is a question which
lies outside the scope of this discussion.
COMPETITION AND THE AcT.

We have seen that a restraint of trade may or may not result
in a restriction of competition, and that competition is restrained
only, if at all, as a result of the restraint of trade, and to speak,
therefore, of a restriction on competition is to put the effect
before the cause and that too an effect which does not always
follow from the cause. It has been frequently said that the
object of the act was to promote competition. 1 34 On the other
hand, it has been said that the act says nothing about competition and does not have that in view. 135 It appears, therefore, that
there is a difference of opinion on this point, which probably
springs from a failure to recognize the distinction between restraints on trade and restraints on competition. The removal of
restraints on trade may furnish an opportunity for competition,
but competition may not ensue. You cannot made a merchant
or a corporation compete if they do not want to, any more than
"'Thompson, D. J., in U. S. v. Chesapeake, &c. Fuel Co. (I9oo) 105 Fed.
93 at 103, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 34 at 48. Harlan, J.,in Northern Securities Co.
v. U. S. (1904) 193 U. S. 197 at 337, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 436, 48 L. Ed. 679, 2
'Fed. A. T. Dec. 338 at 467. Buffington, J., in U. S. v. Reading Co. (igio) 183
Fed. 427 at 460, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 866 at 913, et seq.
'"Holmes, J., in Northern Securities Co. v. U. S. (1904) 193 U. S. 197
at 403, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 436, 48 L. Ed. 679, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 338 at 525, said:
"The court below argued as if maintaining competition were the expressed
object of the act. The act says nothing about competition."
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you can make the proverbial horse drink when you lead him to
water.1 30
Competition is probably determined by economic laws, over
which Congress fortunately has no control. Furthermore, as we
have seen, competition among the sellers is a great advantage to
the buyers, as is competition among the buyers a great advantage
to the sellers; and competition among the sellers is disadvantageous to the sellers, as competition among the buyers is disadvantageous to the buyers. When, therefore, we speak of restricting competition, in order to accurately apply our remarks
to the situation, we must distinguish which side of the market we
are talking about, i. e., whether we are talking from the point of
view of the buyers or sellers. In so far, however, as any of the
acts forbidden by the statute, as monopolizing, etc., restrain competition, the act does in effect operate on competition. The
phrase "every attempt to monopolize" embraces every act of competition, fair or unfair. The difficulty is that no light is shed on
the question of which competition is affected, competition among
the buyers or competition among the sellers. Excessive competition of the buyers can never injure the sellers, but excessive competition among the sellers will injure the sellers, just as excessive
competition among the buyers in the case put will injure them and
not the sellers. The conflict of interest as to competition has
been overlooked by these learned commentators, who seem to feel
that competition should be encouraged, no matter what competition or from whose point of view. The act says nothing about
competition but merely refers fo certain acts of trade and declares them to be unlawful without, however, defining them.
" Holmes, J., in Swift & Co. v. U. S. (1905) 196 U. S. 375 at 4o0, 25
Sup. Ct. Rep. 276, 49 L. Ed. 518, z Fed. A. T. Dec. 641 at 666. When a
given restraint on trade has been abolished (such, for instance, as the dissolution of the Standard Oil Company, assuming that it was in point of
fact a restraint on trade which should have been dissolved) the government and the people sit back and expect competition to be resumed, and
wonder why it does not begin. If it does not happen to suit the component
parts of the Standard Oil Company to compete, they cannot be compelled
to do so. It is one thing to dissolve restraints on the freedom of an individual trader; it is another thing to by law compel him to compete. It is
one thing to prevent an immense aggregation of capital from pursuing unfair
methods of competition; it is another thing to break up that aggregation and

compel the component parts to compete.
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RESTRAINT BY MANUFACTURER ON PRICE OF RESALE.

It frequently happens that a nianufacturer sells his product
throughout the United States, and in order to reach the consumer
is forced to avail himself of the services of jobbers and retailers,
and in many such cases it is a great business advantage to the
manufacturer if his product is always sold in every place at the
same retail price. No one can successfully question the right of
the manufacturer to fix his own price to the consumer in the case
of a sale at the door of the factory. Is that right any the less
because of the intervention of other parties between the manufacturer and the consumer? The manufacturer has generally
sought to accomplish his end by some sort of contractual arrangement with the jobbers or retailers by which the latter agree
to sell again only at the price and in the manner determined by
the manufacturer. Under this method each retailer has the same
profit, and any particular shopkeeper is prevented from cutting
the price on that commodity as an advertisement, and thus injuring the sale of it in other shops where the retail price fixed
is observed. The question as to the validity of these contracts
has generally come up where the arrangement has been made by
owners of patents or manufacturers of proprietary patent medicines. In a number of cases, most of them before the lower
Federal courts, different conclusions have been reached.' 3 7 In
12'In Board of Trade v. Christie (i9o5) i98 U. S. 236, 25 Sup. Ct, Rep.
637, 49 L. Ed. io3i, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 717, reversing 125 Fed. 161. which reversed 121 Fed. 6o8, which reversed Ii6 Fed. 944, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 233, it
appeared that the Chicago Board of Trade maintained an exchange hall for
the exclusive use of its members, collected quotations on the board, and sold
the quotations to the telegraph companies under certain restrictions as to the
persons to whom the quotations are to be furnished by the companies. Certain individuals obtained these quotations in a manner not provided for by
the restrictions, and were distributing them contrary to the regulations
adopted by the Board of Trade and to persons not authorized in those
regulations to receive them. The Board of Trade, it was held, was entitled
to an injunction preventing such distribution. Holmes, J., stated the facts
and said that even if the sales on the Board of Trade were
illegal because gambling transactions, it being contended by the defendants
that the sales were illegal and contrary to public policy, that the board was
entitled to protection as he said that "the statistics of crime are property to
the same extent as any other statistics, even if furnished by a criminal who
furnishes some of the data." This was not a parallel case, although not so
observed by the learned judge, because here the Board of Trade would have
been deprived of its usefulness if the statistics could not be furnished, and
the furnishing of the statistics was part of and entered into the unlawfulness

THE FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST ACT OF 1890

one case in the Supreme Court of the United States 138 it was decided that the owner of a proprietary patent medicine was not
entitled to have an injunction restraining a third party from
selling at less than the fixed price the patent medicine which he
had obtained from a middleman in violation of the contract.
There was, however, a strong dissent, and it is apprehended that
some of the principles involved have been overlooked.' 3 9
The middlemen do not, in a proper economic sense, enter into
the transaction as purchasers of the article. They are in an
of the act, if any, whereas, in the case put the statistics existed independently
of and unconnected with the act of furnishing them. The only restraint on
trade, if there was one, was on the purchase of the information. The party
who had it for sale and controlled the source refused to part with it except
on certain terms, and only the persons complying with those terms could
obtain the data. The case is similar to that of a natural monopoly or a manufacturer who is entitled to sell his manufactured product at any price or on
any terms he may see fit. Injunction refused the manufacturer against a
third party who was buying medicine from persons who were parties to the
contract and re-selling without regard to the price fixed. John D. Park &
Sons v. Hartman (1907) 153 Fed. 24, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 229, reversing 145
Fed. 358, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 999. Confer, U. S. v. Greenhut (1892), 5o Fed.
469, 1 Fed. A. T. Dec. 30 51 Fed. 205, i Fed. A. T. Dec. 33 (1892)
5i Fed. 213, 1 Fed. A. T. Dec. 46. Injunction awarded the manufacturer
against third party who obtained the goods, mutilated the labels and sold at
cut prices. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Jaynes Drug Co. (19o7) 149 Fed. 838,
3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 1o3. In Phillips v. Iola Portland Cement Co. (903) 125
Fed. 593, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 284, a contract by a manufacturer in Kansas with
a jobber in Texas, by which the jobber agreed not to re-sell out of the
State of Texas, was held valid on the questionable ground that it did not
restrain interstate commerce. In Bobbs Merrill Co. v. Straus (1905) 139
Fed. 155, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 755, a number (90%) of the publishers entered
into an agreement not to sell to a dealer in books who should sell their books
to the public below the net price which might be fixed by the publishers in
each case, and a number of booksellers, amounting to 90% of those in
the United States, entered into an agreement to co-operate with the purpose of the publishers' association. A publisher filed a bill for an injunction to restrain the defendant from selling a certain copyrighted book
below the publisher's fixed net price. Defendant was not a member of either
association. No injunction was awarded, the combination being held illegal
as in restraint of trade under the Anti-Trust Law. The defendant had been
black-listed as a price-cutter and was unable to obtain any books. Notice did
not put the defendant under any contractual duty, and the plaintiffs were
merely trying to enforce the terms of the unlawful agreement against the
defendant only. Since no contract liability, plaintiff could not enforce. Anyhow case does not touch the point. No infringement of the copyright laws.
'Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. J. D. Park & Sons (9I), 220 U. S. 373, 3
Sup. Ct. Rep. 376, 55 L. Ed. 502, 4 Fed. A. T. Dec. i, affirming 164 Fed. 8o3,
3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 470.
" See, however, article "Price Restrictions on the Re-Sale of Chattels,"
by William J. Shroder (19s), 25 HARv. LAW REV. 59, in which the author
concludes that apart from the Anti-trust law, such restrictions are void at
common law, in the case of chattels generally, and in the case of manufacturing articles by secret process, and that to sustain the validity of such restraints of fixing prices, would render nugatory the efforts of a quarter of
a century to enforce the public policy declared in the Anti-trust statutes.
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entirely different class from the consumer, and the law has no
tender regard for them. The deduction from this, however, is
not that an arrangement must be made by which the middlemen
are deprived of profit, but that freedom of trade among middlemen is not necessary, and therefore restrictions on that freedom
of trade are not contrary to the common law. 140 In the case,
however, of a combination of manufacturers, the circumstances
are different. If they are strong enough to control the market,
they may restrain the freedom of the purchaser in buying as
effectually by such agreement as by any other arrangement among
themselves.

14

1

It was assumed by the Supreme Court of the United States
in the case referred to that the case of the owner. of a proprietary
medicine, a patent or commodity manufactured by a secret
process, standing, therefore, somewhat in the position of a
monopolist, is in a better position than an ordinary manufacturer.
In the first place, it is erroneous to argue for a greater right in
such a case on the part of the owner of a patent than in the case
of an ordinary manufacturer, because the patentee, having a
monopoly granted by law and akin, therefore, to the case of a
natural monopoly, may well suffer a more stringent regulation
as to his exercise of that monopoly than a private manufacturer
who produces a commodity solely by his own business skill and
manufacturing experience. The Act of i8go, therefore, should
be amended so as to distinguish as to the right of restriction on
resale between the cases of (I) the patentee, (2) the individual
manufacturer, (3)a combination of manufacturers, and here an
addit'onal distinction should be drawn between a combination
strong enough to control the market, and one which has not such
strength.
The distinction to be observed is between the case of an
individual and the case of a combination. It is extremely advan..See remarks of Lurton, J., in J. D. Park & Sons v. Hartman (1907),
153 Fed. 24 at 44, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 229 at 259.
'*This case must be distinguished from that of a trader who does not
produce the article he buys in the market with an eye to future sale at a
profit. No restrictions imposed on him by his vendor or by him on his
vendee will be valid. This is obviously a different case.
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tageous to the manufacturer to have a uniform retail price. It
is likewise to the advantage of the consumer, and competition
is not interfered with because the manufacturer must compete
with other manufacturers throughout the country who are doing
the same thing as himself. An individual manufacturer cannot
fix any price by means of an agreement of re-sale that he cannot
maintain against competitors at his door. The competition
beneficial to the consumer, and which he requires, is not competition among middlemen as to obtaining a product from the same
manufacturer, but a competition among other consumers, and
perhaps among middlemen as to obtaining products from different manufacturers.
We have specially discussed proceedings by the United
States under Section 4 relating to labor unions, monopolies, patents and common carriers, all of which seem to depend on special
principles. There still remain for consideration combinations
relating to buying and selling of commodities in general. The
legality of such a combination may be involved either in proceedings by the United States under Section 4 for its dissolution
or under proceedings between the members of the combination to
142
enforce its provisions as between themselves.
We have already referred to cases between private parties
involving the validity of a contract or a combination in restraint of trade but chiefly for the purpose of pointing out the
remedy of the parties, and we shall now consider them together
with the validity of an ordinary combination in restraint of trade
in proceedings (i) by the United States (z) between the parties
" We have already noticed that a combination or a member thereof may
proceed against a third party notwithstanding the invalidity of the combination, and we have already noted the omission of the discussion of criminal
proceedings under the act. Where the proceedings are under §4, the combination must affect interstate buying or selling. Where the proceeding is between individual members of a combination, no question of interstate commerce need be involved if other grounds of Federal jurisdiction, such as
diverse citizenship, appear. Of course the act only provides for three distinct remedies, and the conclusion that the invalidity of a combination may
be set up in a suit between the parties is merely a deduction from the provisions of the act making such an act unlawful, and seems to be well settled
notwithstanding the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brewer. See note 26,
ante.
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There is no reason to think that there is any distinction in the test
to be applied in these two cases, at least none has been suggested
in any reported decision.
If we adopt a literal construction of the act, every combination affecting interstate commerce, no matter to how small an
extent is void. But as the Supreme Court of the United States
has not placed such construction on the act, we may dismiss this
view without further consideration. But suppose a liberal construction is adopted. The question then is, what is the
test of the validity of a combination under the act. Does
the combination restrain the freedom of interstate buying or
selling? If it does, does it do so to an extent condemned by the
law? This raises a further question what restraint on the freedom of the buying and selling is condemned by the law? To
this question no exact answer can be given in the present state of
the authorities, and it is not likely that the question ever will be
answered so long as we retain the spirit of the common law.
The law can no more hamper itself by a definition on this point
than it can by a definition of fraud; both are questions of fact
to be determined, it is true, in the light of certain well-settled
principles, but principles which will receive a different application
in every particular case. The eminent statesmen who undertake
to solve this problem of what is an unlawful restraint of trade by
legislation will probably find that they have attempted the impossible and only add another to the many legislative wrecks with
which our history is strewn. It has frequently been suggested at
common law that combinations affecting necessaries of life stand
on a footing by themselves, and are to be judged by a stricter
rule than is to be applied to combinations affecting commodities,
which cannot be classified as necessaries of life: in this respect
occupying perhaps a position between the case of a public service
corporation and an ordinary merchant. If we adopt a liberal
construction of the statute, there is room for such a distinction
in applying its provisions. This distinction was drawn in
Dueber Watch Case Mfg. Co. v. E. Howard Watch and Clock

THE FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST ACT OF 1890

Co., 1 43 but no other case has been found in which it has been

referred to.
The distinction between a combination and a monopoly
should again be pointed out. A morropoly may exist without a
combination, and a combination may be carried on without producing a monopoly. A monopoly may be the result of a combination, so far as any connection between the two is material.
A combination may, however, achieve such a control over the
market as to restrain the freedom of buying and selling to such
an extent as to produce the evils of a monopoly.
Let us examine into this question of the control of the
market. Suppose there are one hundred persons engaged in selling a certain commodity and they are all in competition with each
other. If one is removed, it is clear, of course, that to this extent
competition is diminished and the freedom of the purchaser in
buying is correspondingly restrained. Removal of one competitor,
however, would obviously produce such a slight restraint that
the law could take no account of it. Suppose, however, ninetynine competitors were removed and one was left. Here all competition would be eliminated and the freedom of the purchaser in
buying would be correspondingly restrained, and the law might
well take account of the situation. Where, however, between the
two cases of ninety-nine and one is the law to draw the line? No
satisfactory answer to this question can be made.
It is further to be remarked that if all the competitors are
removed by the successful effort of one competitor in driving the
others out, the law does not condemn him for what he has done,
and the purchasers must put up with the restraint thus imposed
on the freedom of their buying so long as he is able to maintain
his position. So also if competitors are removed by death or
bankruptcy, the law takes no account. In like manner, in modern times, if they are removed by purchase on the part of an
individual competitor, there is no concern of the law. Where,
however, a number of competitors, such as five or ten, com143 (1895) 66 Fed. 637, i Fed. A. T. Dec. 42r, affirming 55 Fed. 85i, 1 Fed.
A. T. Dec. 178, where demurrer to complaint was sustained. See remarks of
Shiras, J., in U. S. v. Trans.-Mo. Fgt. Assn. (1893) 58 Fed. 86 at 88, 1 Fed.
A. T. Dec. 86 at 226.
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bine and then as a combination proceed to buy up the remainder
of the competitors, the law does say that they have over-stepped
the limits of freedom in trade.
SIZE OF THE BUSINESS.

It has been suggested that the size of the business may be a
determining factor, but this suggestion raises the same difficulty,
what size business is unlawful? It has been said that it is not
a monopoly in the legal sense of the term for a corporation to
sell the whole or a large part of products in a certain line; that
the act does not condemn the ownership but the monopoly therein,
144
all other persons being free to engage in the same business.
We have collected in the note a few cases where the size of the
business, indicated with reference to the whole market has been
referred to as a determining factor .in condemning the combi14 5
nation.
TRIFLING RESTRAINTS.

It has often been said that the act does not apply to trifling
restraints. It is, of course, a question of fact whether in any
given case the restraint is trifling, and, as may be expected, no
."Jackson, J., In re Greene (1892),

52 Fed. 1O4 at 115, I Fed. A. T.

Dec. 54 at 71. See article "Is a Large Corporation an Illegal Combination
or Monopoly under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act," by George F. Canfield, 9
COL. LAW REV. 95, where the author concludes that it is not, on the ground
that a large corporation was not illegal at common law, and the prevailing
idea of its illegality is due to failure (a) to recognize that no principle of
the common law condemns mere growth in size, (b) to distinguish between
contract rights and property rights, the denomination of trade by contract
only being obnoxious to the common law; that the Act of i89o was passed
in view of these principles, and it cannot be extended to condemn a corporation merely because of its size. The act does not reach such a corporation
until it has entered into an agreement in restraint of trade or some illegal
act pursuant thereto. The article, it is to be noted, was published before the
decision of the Supreme Court in the Standard Oil and Tobacco cases had
been handed down.
'0 75%-Wheeler-Stenzel Co. v. Nat'l Window Glass Assn. (1907) 152
Fed. 864, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 208; 70%-Nat'l Harrow Co. v. Hench (897),
83 Fed. 36, 1 Fed. A. T. Dec. 742; 98%-Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Voight
& Sons Co. (199o)
212 U. S. 227, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 28o, 53 L. Ed. 486, 3
Fed. A. T. Dec. 48o, affirming (i9o6) 148 Fed. 939, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 44, s. c.

78 C. C. 567, 204 U. S. 673. In Standard Oil Co. v. U. S. (I911) 221 U. S. 1,

31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 502, 55 L. Ed. 619, 4 Fed. A. T. Dec. 79, affirming and
modifying 173 Fed. 177, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 696, and in U. S. v. American
Tobacco Co. (1911) 221 U. S. io6, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 632, 55 L. Ed. 663, 4
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hard and fast line can be drawn and decisions will vary according
to the individual views of the judges deciding them. A few
14
cases have been collected in the note. 6
Two views are possible: is a restraint trifling with respect
to the body or volume of the particular trade as to which the
restraint exists, or is it merely trifling with respect to the volume
and extent of interstate trade as a whole? This question of fact
is probably an approach from the other side of the same inquiry
as to control of the market. If the restraint does not result in
giving the combination a control of the buying and selling, it is
trifling.
The determination of what amounts to a control of the
market is the same problem, from another point of view, as the
question of what is an undue restraint on the freedom of buying
and selling, and is purely an issue of fact. A great many of the
earlier cases under the act arose on demurrer, the question being
whether the unlawful agreement was sufficiently alleged. These
cases are of no value or very little value in the inquiry we now
have in hand. A few of the cases turning on questions of fact
will now be referred to. Before considering them, however, it
will be necessary to discuss the bearing of intent in considering
the application of the provisions of the act to combinations in
restraint of trade.
INTENT.

At common law, motive or intent in entering into or performing a contract is ordinarily immaterial, and where material
is generally so in determining the legality or illegality of the conFed. A. T. Dec. 168, reversing 164 Fed. 700, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 427, the court
was influenced very largely by the size of the defendant combinations in deciding that they were unlawful.
1" The fact that trade in the particular commodity restrained amounted
to only io of the whole trade of dealers in that line, immaterial, Montague
& Co. v. Lowry (19o4), 193 U. S. 38, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 307, 48 L. Ed. 6o8,
2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 327.
The fact that only 3% of the business of the -competing railroads was the subject of competition between them and restrained,
was held immaterial, Northern Securities Co. v. U. S. (19o4) 193 U. S. 197,
24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 436, 48 L. Ed. 679, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 338. Control of oneninth of the product of copper in the United States not sufficient to indicate
a monopoly, Bigelow v. Calumet & Heckla Mining Co., et al. (I9O9), 167 Fed.
721, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 618, affirming 167 Fed. 704, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 593,
which reversed 155 Fed. 869, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 293.
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tract. So far as covenants in restraint of trade are concerned,
no clear statement can be found in the books of the bearing of
the intention of the parties.

The common law rule was probably this: where the restraint
is only on the trade of the covenantor, and the covenantee is by
taking such a covenant acquiring control of the market, the
question of intent or guilty knowledge on the part of the covenantor seems to be material in determining his status under the
contract when he is a plaintiff. He cannot recover if he is a
participant in the unlawful design of the covenantee. If he is
innocent he can recover. 147 If, however, the covenantee is plaintiff, the covenantor can set up the illegality of the covenant in
ciefence in all cases, the intent of the covenantee being immaterial. Sometimes, where it is not clear on the facts whether the
covenant is unlawful, the intent of the covenantee is referred to
as a material ingredient. So in the case of a combination where
all parties covenant in restraint of trade, they are all equally
guilty, and in a suit between them any one of them may set up
in defence the illegality of the covenant as in restraint of trade,
and the presence of an intent to control the market is only
material in a close case on the facts. Where the combination
clearly produces an unlawful restraint on its face or in connection with the surrounding circumstances, a defendant will set
up his innocence in vain.
In all these cases arising at common law, we must remember
that the parties whose trade was restrained by the performance
of a covenant or the carrying out of the terms of a combination
in restraint of trade were without remedy, and the common law
only indirectly relieved them by refusing to enforce the terms of
such a covenant or combination as amongst the members. When,
however, we examine-the remedy conferred by Section 4 on the
United States, a somewhat different question is raised. This
remedy, if we adopt a liberal construction of the statute, is confined to those cases where at common law, in a suit between the
parties, the covenant or combination would be declared void.
112 COLU-MBIA LAW REVIEW, 97-133, 220-25r.
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The only object of the remedy conferred by Section 4 is to give
the United States power to interfere in the case where the buyers
or sellers were helpless at common law, and since the law in modern times seems to be only concerned with this indirect restraint
on the freedom of buying or selling, the absence or presence of
intent seems to be of small moment. If the freedom of trade
is in fact restrained, it is small comfort to the parties whose trade
is restrained to be told that the parties concerned did not intend
to produce the restraint, and if their freedom is not so restrained,
there does not seem to be any case with which the statute need
concern itself under a liberal construction of its provisions. We
have collected in the note a number of expressions as to the
bearing of the question of intent in the cases arising under the
48
act.'
"' "It is the effect of the contract upon interstate commerce, not the
intention of the parties in entering into it which determines whether it falls
within the prohibition of the statute," Day, J., in Chesapeake & Ohio Fuel Co.
v. United States (I9O2), 115 Fed. 6io at 623, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 151 at 167.
"The statute outlines an offence but requires for its complete commission no
ulterior motive such as to defraud," per curiam, American Biscuit Co. v.
Klotz (89), 44 Fed. 721 at 725, I Fed. A. T. Dec. 2 at 8. Holmes, J., in
Northern Securities Co. v. U. S. (1904)

193 U. S. 197 at 4o9, 24 Sup. Ct.

Rep. 436, 48 L. Ed. 679, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 338 at 530, says that there is no
combination in restraint of trade until something is done with the intent to
exclude strangers to the combination from competing with it. "The parties
to it (the combination) are presumed to intend the inevitable consequences
of their acts, and neither their actual intent nor the reasonableness of the
restraint imposed may withdraw it from the denunciation of the statute,"
Sanborn, J., in U. S. v. Standard Oil Co. (igog) 173 Fed. 177 at 179, 3 Fed.
A. T. Dec. 696 at 700. In a suit on a lease of a steamer, a covenant by the
vendee not to enter into competition with the vendor was held void because
of the dominant intent of the parties to control interstate commerce, Darius
Cole Transp. Co. v. White Star Line (I9IT), 186 Fed. 63, 4 Fed. A. T. Dec.
36; with dissent that the intention of the parties was immaterial so long as
the stipulations were reasonable. Where the acts complained of do not violate
the act, intention and purpose to restrain competition are immaterial, Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co. (I9O3) 125 Fed. 454, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 271;
see remarks of Sanborn, J., on p. 457, 275, as follows: "It has now been settled by repeated decisions of the Supreme Court that this question must
be tried, not by the intent with which the combination was made, nor by its
effect upon traders, producers, or consumers, but by the necessary effect which
it has in defeating the purpose of the law." In Anderson v. Shawnee Compress Co. (x9o6) 87 Pac. Rep. 315 at 317, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 122 at 129,
Pancoast, J., said: "It is immaterial in determining the legality of such contracts whether or not it was entered into with any evil intent, but the material
consideration is its injurious tendency and the power thereby given to control
prices," and then dwelt on at length on the apparent purpose of the contract
to secure a monopoly as determining its illegality. When the question of
intent is a question for the jury, see U. S. Consolidated Seeded Raisin Co.
v. Griffin & Skelley Co. (io3) 126 Fed. 364 at 371, 372, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec.
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288 at 298. In U. S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn. (1897) 166 U. S. 290
at 341, 17 Super. Ct. Rep. 549, 41 L. Ed. IOO7, I Fed. A. T. Dec. 648 at 694,
where the case was heard on bill and answer, Peckham, J., said that the
intent alleged in the bill was not a necessary fact to be proved; that the
question was one of law in regard to the meaning and effect of the agreement itself, namely, does the agreement restrain trade or commerce in any
way so as to be a violation of the act? Holmes, J., in Swift & Co. v. U. S.
(1905) 196 U. S. 375 at 396, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 276, 49 L. Ed. 518, 2 Fed. A. T.
Dec. 641 at 663, said: "Intent is almost essential to such a combination and
is essential to such an attempt. Where acts are not sufficient in themselves
to produce a result which the law seeks to prevent-for instance, the monopoly-but require further acts in addition to the mere forces of nature to
bring that result to pass, an intent to bring it to pass is necessary in order
to produce a dangerous probability that it will happen. Commonwealth v.
Peaslee, 177 Mass. 267, 272. But when that intent and the consequent dangerous probability exist, this statute, like many others and like the common law
in some cases, directs itself against that dangerous probability as well as
against the completed result. What we have said disposes incidentally of
the objection to the bill as multifarious. The unity of the plan embraces all
the parts." In -Bigelow v. Calumet & Heckla Mining Co. (19o9) 167 Fed.
721, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 618, affirming 167 Fed. 704, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 593,
which reversed 155 Fed. 869, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 293, one competing corporation acquired control of the capital stock of another, and the court held
that some proof of unlawful intent to, monopolize was necessary, as there
was no provision in terms for a monopoly which was not brought about as a
necessary legal consequence of the purchase. Fuller, C. J., in U. S. v. E.
C. Knight Co. (1895) 156 U. S. i at i7, I5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 249, 39 L. Ed. 325, I
Fed. A. T. Dec. 379 at 393, said that as there was no proof of any intent to
restrain interstate commerce, the fact that interstate commerce might be
indirectly affeced was not enough to entitle the complainant to a decree.
Lacombe, J., in Lawlor, et al., v. Lowe, et al. (I9I), 187 Fed. 522 at 524, 4
Fed. A. T. Dec. 264 at 266, in an action under §7, said, where an unlawful
combination has been shown to have brought about an injury to a person's
business, recovery may be had though the impelling motive of the combination was an effort to better the interest of the combiners, which, except for
the Anti-Trust Act might be proper and lawful. The question of intent referred to in this case was intent to do the acts charged and the necessary
consequences thereof, irrespective of whether there was or was not an intent
to restrain trade. In Tonolipio Lorn v. Bradley (I99), 171 Fed. 95i, where
a license agreement of the Victor Talking Machine Company, was held
valid, although restricting prices; Chatfield, J., said: "A certain intent and
certain motives which need not be discussed at length must be present to
establish the interference with competition and the existence of the monopoly
at which the statute was aimed." In Camors and McConnell Co. v. McConnell, 14o Fed. 412, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 813, 14o Fed. 987, 2 Fed. A. T.
Dec. 825, in a proceeding by a covenantee to enforce a covenant in restraint
of trade, the court said that those cases where an otherwise valid contract
was deemed unlawful because 6f the intent of the covenantee to monopolize,
were cases of direct proceedings against monopolies. In Dueber Watch Case
Mfg. Co. v. E. Howard Watch & Clock Co., et al. (1895), 66 Fed. 637, I
Fed. A. T. Dec. 421, affirming 55 Fed. 851, I Fed. A. T. Dec. 178, a demurrer
to complain was sustained, although there was an allegation of purpose of
establishing a monopoly. In Citizens Wholesale Supply Co. v. Snyder, 201
Fed. 907 (1912), action was brought against a number of citizens for combining to sustain the validity of an ordinance to prevent peddling, which
ordinance was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United
States in 203 U. S. 507. The court said that the citizens had acted in good
faith and were therefore not liable.
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In Standard Oil Co. v. United States,'4 9 the court dwelt very
strongly on the various steps in the defendant combination as
showing an intent to monopolize. Indeed, this presumption of
an intention to monopolize seems to have probably influenced the
court to reach the conclusion that the defendant company was
an unlawful combination. So, also, in United States v. American Tobacco Co.,' ° the court was strongly influenced by the same
presence of intent to monopolize. Indeed, in these two recent
cases the materiality of unlawful intent, that is, intent to monopolize, has been made more prominent than in any of the earlier
cases.
It seems from these cases cited that the courts lay great
stress on the presence or absence of intent. It is submitted, however, that intent is entirely immaterial, at least in civil cases,
unless there is a very close question on the fact whether there
is or is not a control of the market achieved, and, in such a case,
intent to achieve that control may be referred to as buttressing
the conclusion that the control has been actually achieved.
It will now be well to refer to some of the leading cases where
the decision has turned on the question of fact whether there
was an unlawful restraint on trade by a combination, that is
whether the combination acquired a control of the market.
In United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 5 ' it appeared that 152
the American Sugar Ref. Company, which we shall refer to as
the Company, a New Jersey corporation, had, prior to 1892,
obtained control of all the refineries in the United States except
four in Philadelphia and one in Boston, at which time the
Philadelphia refineries produced 33 per cent., and the Boston
refineries 2 per cent. of the sugar refined in the United States,
and active competition existed between these refineries and the
14 (i91I)
221 U. S.
Dec. 79.
" (I9II) 221 U. S.
Dec. i68.
1" (i895) 156 U. S.
Dec. 379, 6o Fed. 306,

I, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 502, 55 L. Ed. 619, 4 Fed. A. T.

io6, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 632, 55 L. Ed. 663, 4 Fed. A. T.
1, 15 Sup. Ct Rep. 249, 39 L. Ed. 325, i Fed. A. T.

i Fed. A. T. Dec. 25o, 6o Fed. 934, 1 Fed. A. T.

Dec. 258.

'See

findings of fact by Butler, J., in the court below, 6o Fed. 306 at

307, I Fed. A. T. Dec. 25o at :252, which were approved by the Supreme Court.
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Company. In 1892, the Company bought the stock of the four
Philadelphia concerns from the various stockholders by individual purchasers, and paid therefor by stock of the Company,
the capital of which was increased for the purpose. The object
of the Company in making the purchase was to obtain a greater
influence or more perfect control over the business of refining
and selling sugar in the United States. The stockholders in each
of the Philadelphia companies acted in unison but in ignorance
of the like action by the stockholders of the other companies, and
in each case the entire corporation and its assets were turned
over to the Company. After these purchases, the Company controlled 90 per cent. of the business of sugar refining in the United
States, and the stockholders of the other companies were left free
to establish other refineries or to continue the business as they
saw fit. The United States filed a bill against the Company and
the four Philadelphia companies, setting out that the transaction
was in violation of the Act of 189 o . The relief sought 153 was
cancellation of the agreements under which the stock was transferred, the redelivery of the stock to the parties respectively,
and an injunction against the further performance of the agreements and further violation of the act. It therefore appeared
that in this case the government caught the combination, as it
were, in the very beginning. The bill was dismissed, the case
going off on the point that the transaction in question did not
amount to interstate commerce, and although the conclusion of
the court on this point has probably little support in reason, we
shall offer no criticism, as that subject lies outside the limits of
this article. The case, therefore, does not involve anything
really of value for our purpose except the remarks of Harlan, J.,
in the dissenting opinion that the transaction in question amounting, as he concluded, to interstate commerce, was unlawful under
the Anti-Trust Act. The combination in this case was caught,
in the act of eliminating a competitor, and the court failed to
see the effect of that on interstate buying and selling. The case
may probably be considered as overruled on the question of
'

As stated by Fuller, C. J.,on p. 9.
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interstate commerce, and if it came before the court today, would
probably be decided the other way.
In Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States,'54 there was
an agreement among certain manufacturers of cast iron pipe,
by which competitive bidding on public contracts within certain
specified territory was abolished, and the price to be paid was
fixed by the officers of the association, and the work then given
out among the members. The agreement was entered into for
the purpose of preventing ruinous competition and raising the
price of the product to a reasonable basis but not beyond. The
result of the agreement was that the members of the association
obtained an actual monopoly of the business in large districts,
but as there were other mills in different parts of the United
States, were compelled to keep the price below the limit which
would involve competition from such competitors. This amount
varied according to the geographical distance of the place where
the iron was to be supplied from to competing mills and the
mills of the combination, the rate of freight to be paid on cast
iron being a material factor in fixing the price. The manufacturers entering into the agreement apparently manufactured
about one-half of the output of the country,' 55 and had the
advantage over the other manufacturers in freight rates in selling within the specified territory. Although it was contended
that the proces fixed by the association were reasonable, it
appeared that they were considerably above the price at which
pipe could be manufactured and sold at a fair profit. The defendant also sold their product at distant points at less price than they
did at home. The combination was held illegal and an injunction issued accordingly on bill filed by the United States. This
was a case, therefore, where some of the sellers combined among
themselves against the other sellers, and, by reason of the circumstances of the case and the geographical location of their mills,
a' (I899) 175 U. S. 211, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 96, 44 L. Ed. 136, I Fed. A. T.
Dec. loog, modifying and affirming 85 Fed. 271, I Fed. A. T. Dec. 772, which
reversed 78 Fed. 712, I Fed. A. T. Dec. 631.
' See pp. 223-224, where it is stated that the manufacturers' tonnage was
220,000 tons. Other mills in the prescribed territory had an annual tonnage
of 170,500 tons, and those in the free territory 348,oo tons.
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were able to make the combination effective within a certain territory and under it could effect a certain enhancement of price,
which, however, could not be carried beyond a certain point owing
to the competition of the rest of the sellers. The combination,
so far as it was effective and within the designated territory,
achieved a control of the market.
1 6
5
In United States v. E. I. duPont-de Nemours Co., et al.,
a number of dealers in powder and explosives formed a trade
association under which they conducted business for a number
of years, and some of them incorporated and proceeded to eliminate competition by buying up corporate competitors and dissolving them. It appeared that the active agents made what the
court characterized as "enormous profits," and did, in one line,
IOO per cent. of the business of the country, and, in other lines, from 64 per cent. to 73 per cent.. The combination was held void
under the act in proceedings by the United States and injunction
issued accordingly because the evidence showed that the combination for years persisted in the attempt to control the powder
business which attempt resulted 'in complete success.
In Standard Oil Co. v. United States,'57 a bill \was filed by
the United States under Section 4 against the Standard Oil Company and a number of subsidiary companies and several individuals alleging an unlawful combination in restraint of trade in
petroleum throughout the United States. A decree for the United
States was affirmed, with slight modifications on appeal. It
appeared that the Standard Oil Company was a holding company
which had acquired stock control of a large number of corporations engaged in various branches of the oil business, and the
question was whether this control of the oil business was sufficient to make a combination void under the act. The court
held that it was illegal, laying great stress on the circumstance
that the facts in the case showed a guilty intent to monopolize
and exclude others from the business and bring about an unlawful restraint on trade, and further, that the Standard Oil Coin'
"'

(1911)
(1911)

188 Fed. 127, 4 Fed. A. T. Dec. 339.
221 U. S. I, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 502, 55 L. Ed. 619, 4 Fed. A. T.

Dec. 79, affirming and modifying 173 Fed. 177, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 696;
Fed. 290, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. i73.

152

THE FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST ACT OF 1890

pany had such a dominant and complete control of the selling and
buying as to destroy what the court below called the potentiality
of competition. As the language of the learned judge who wrote
the opinion in this case is most obscure and at points almost
unintelligible, it is difficult to form a clear idea of the exact
grounds of decision. A decree was entered directing the holding company to divest itself of the holdings in the subsidiary
companies. 15s
In United States v. American Tobacco Co.,150 the proceeding
was by the United States under Section 4 against a number of
corporations and individuals charging that they were a combination in restraint of trade in tobacco and the products of tobacco,
which was void under the Act of 189o.10 The court held that the
combination was void because a state of competition in the tobacco
trade was gradually terminated by the growth and power of the
defendant combination which bought out competitors, dosed
their plants, took covenants in restraint of trade, all of which
clearly demonstrated a conscious intention to violate the act. The
court characterized the control of the defendant combination as a
vast power over the buying and selling of tobacco. By "vast"
is perhaps meant a degree of control which is undue and therefore violates the act. The case was remanded to the court below
to supervise the dissolution of the combination, the Supreme
Court being of opinion that owing to the intricacies of the intercorporate holdngs and the fact that the principal defendant, the
American Tobacco Company, was not only a holding company but
also a proprietary company, it would not be practicable to immediately frame and enter a proper decree of dissolution.
'
The court said that the circumstance that the defendant company controlled a very small percentage of the crude oil products was immaterial because the absolute control over the refined product which had been achieved
inevitably brought about a substantial control over the crude product; that
is, the Standard Oil Co. obtained control of the selling of almost the entire
market in refined oil, and therefore being the only seller was really the only
buyer of the crude oil and able to control the price therefor. This shows
that it is totally unnecessary for a combination to actually control the source
of supply of a natural product when the purchase price can be controlled.
"' (1911)
221 U. S. io6, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 632, 55 L. Ed. 663, affirming

and modifying 164 Fed. 700, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 427.

" It appeared in this case that the combination bought a raw product and
sold it again after manufacture; that it controlled both the buying and
selling and therefore restrained trade both ways.
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In order to avoid prolonging the discussion to an undue
length, we have only referred to the principal cases involving the
validity under the act of combinations relating to ordinary business. It is apprehended, however, that sufficient authority has
been cited to demonstrate that the real question involved is
whether the combination has acquired such control of the market
that it is in a position to dictate the terms of the buying and
selling. In many of these cases the court has referred to and
obviously been influenced by methods used in achieving the control, as taking covenants not to trade, buying out of competitors,
methods of unfair competition, etc. It seems, however, as if
these considerations are, after all, immaterial if we are right in
the conclusion that the real evil aimed at by the law is the control
of the market. If that control is acquired, it makes no difference
how it is done. The control must be destroyed. If the control
is not accomplished there is nothing for the law to complain of.
We have concluded that covenants in restraint of trade are
only unlawful under a liberal construction of the act when the
combination covenantee acquires control of the market. Why
should the law be different when we approach the subject from
the point of view of the combination and consider the covenants
as the means of achieving that control? In other words, if
instead of considering the enforceability of the covenant as between the parties, we consider the state of facts brought about
by the making of the covenant, and the state of facts which we
are seeking to do away with is the same state of facts which if
it exists makes the covenant unlawful, then it seems as if there
should be no distinction between such covenants whether we
consider their enforceability between the parties or whether we
consider the interference with the buying and selling which is
brought about by the performance of the covenant. There does
not seem to be anything unlawful about unfair competition
except as respects the party competed against. Those whose
buying and selling is attempted to be restrained are not harmed
unless that restraint is actually accomplished.
Roland R. Foulke.
Philadelphia.

